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A partial folk theorem for games with private learning
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Department of Economics, University of Texas at Austin
The payoff matrix of a ﬁnite stage game is realized randomly and then the stage
game is repeated inﬁnitely. The distribution over states of the world (a state cor-
responds to a payoff matrix) is commonly known, but players do not observe na-
ture’s choice. Over time, they can learn the state in two ways. After each round,
each player observes his own realized payoff (which may be stochastic, condi-
tional on the state) and he observes a noisy public signal of the state (whose infor-
mativeness may vary with the actions chosen). Actions are perfectly observable.
The result is that for any function that maps each state to a payoff vector that is
feasible and individually rational in that state, there is a sequential equilibrium in
which patient players learn the realized state with arbitrary precision and achieve
a payoff close to the one speciﬁed for that state. That result extends to the case
where there is no public signal, but instead players receive very closely correlated
private signals of the vector of realized payoffs.
Keywords. Repeated games, learning, folk theorem.
JEL classification. C73, D83.
1. Introduction
Consider a repeated stage game in which the sets of players and actions are known, but
the distribution of payoffs conditional on action proﬁles is chosen randomly once and
for all at the start of play, and the players do not observe nature’s choice. The players
have a common prior over the ﬁnite set of possible states of the world and they have
two ways to learn (directly) the state over time. First, each player observes the proﬁle
of actions and his own realized payoff in each period: that payoff is a random variable
whose distribution depends on the state. Second, every period there is a noisy public
signal of the state. The public signal varies in informativeness across action proﬁles and
stochastically incorporates the information in the privately observed payoffs. A player
may also learn about the state indirectly, if the actions of other players reveal their his-
tory of private payoffs. This paper, extending the result of Wiseman (2005), establishes
for such games a partial folk theorem of the following sort: for any function mapping
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each state of the world to a payoff vector that is feasible and individually rational in that
state, there exists a sequential equilibrium in which patient players achieve the payoff
speciﬁedforwhateverstateisrealized. (Thatfolktheoremis“partial”becausetheremay
be equilibria without learning that yield ex ante—that is, unconditional on the state—
expected payoffs outside the set derived here.) That result also holds in the case where
there is no public signal, but players receive very closely correlated private signals of the
vector of realized payoffs in each period (if there are at least three players and cheap talk
is allowed).
One example of such a game is the situation of oligopolists introducing a product
into a new market with uncertain demand. Every month, each seller sets a publicly ob-
served price, and sees her own sales and a noisy public indicator of total sales in the
market.1 Another situation that ﬁts the model is co-authors presenting a joint research
paper. Each author sees which seminars and conferences the other is invited to, but




and each others’ returns only approximately.
Theserepeatedgameswithunknownpayoffdistributionsandprivatelearningarein
some ways analogous to repeated games with imperfect public monitoring. In the latter
class of games, focusing on perfect public equilibria (PPE), in which players’ strategies
depend only on public information, is a fruitful approach to obtain folk theorems (as in
Fudenberg et al. 1994). The key insight in establishing the existence of a PPE in their set-
ting is that the set of best responses to a public strategy proﬁle always includes a public
strategy: when the other players’ future actions depend only on public information, a
player loses nothing by ignoring his private information. In the current context, how-
ever, a perfect public equilibrium may fail to exist; there may be no public strategy best
responsetoapublicstrategyproﬁle,fortworeasons. First,aplayer’sprivateinformation
inﬂuenceshisexpectationoffuturepublicsignalsandthushisexpectationsofthefuture
play of his opponents. Second, the public history may call for him to play a sequence of
actions that he knows from his private signals yields a payoff below his minmax payoff.
For both reasons, it may be costly for a player to ignore his private information, and so
any best response must be a private strategy.
More generally, the potential for private and public beliefs to diverge creates a difﬁ-
culty in deriving a folk theorem of the type desired when players learn privately. (Such a
divergenceofbeliefsis,almostbydeﬁnition,unlikely,butdependingonthesignalstruc-
ture, it may occur with positive probability in equilibrium.) For example, suppose that
the public signals that the players use to determine their actions in equilibrium suggest
very strongly that nature has chosen state A, but player 1’s private payoffs indicate state
B even more strongly, so that his private belief assigns probability close to 1 to state B. In
that situation, player 1 believes that eventually the public belief will converge to state B
1RelatedworkonthattopicincludesVives(1989,2002),KihlstromandVives(1992),Mirmanetal.(1994),
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if players continue to experiment, but (i) in the future, equilibrium may specify only ac-
tions that yield the same payoffs in all states, so that no further learning occurs, or (ii)
thecurrentpublicbeliefmayputsolittleweightonstateBthattheexpectedtimebefore
convergence is very long, even if the equilibrium calls for continued experimentation.
Further, in state B the equilibrium actions speciﬁed for state A may yield a lower pay-
off to player 1 than the actions designed to punish player 1 for a deviation in state A
yield, and so player 1 deviates. In response, however, the other players may conclude
that player 1 must believe in state B, and so the public belief may adjust very far toward
state B. But then such a deviation may be proﬁtable for player 1 even when his private
information is consistent with state A, if the punishment proﬁle speciﬁed for him in
state B gives him a higher payoff when the actual state is A than does the on-path proﬁle
speciﬁed in state A.
In this paper, the way around such complications is to construct equilibrium block
strategies, in which actions depend only on recent public signals. For example, if the
blocks are 100 periods long, then the actions in period 199 are determined by the public
signals from periods 101 through 198 only. In effect, the players coordinate their actions
using a public “dummy belief” over states, which is reset to the prior at the beginning of
each block. This approach bounds the possible divergence between the private beliefs
and the dummy belief. In particular, a patient player prefers not to deviate even if the
dummy belief, after a sequence of misleading public signals, calls for an action proﬁle
that he believes gives him a very low payoff for the duration of the current block: at the
start of the next block, the dummy belief reverts to the prior, and with high likelihood,
experimentation in the next block (and all future blocks) reveals the true state and en-
ables the other players either to give him his equilibrium payoff or to effectively punish
his deviation. The strategies constructed are public on the equilibrium path, but after
deviating, a player uses a private strategy temporarily, as is described in detail later. For
that reason, the strategies are neither a “belief-free” equilibrium, as in Hörner and Lovo
(2009)a n dHörner et al. (2011a), for example, nor a “perfect public ex post” equilibrium,
as in Fudenberg and Yamamoto (2010).
An additional difﬁculty in that construction is that a player being minmaxed may be
able to unilaterally block learning: a player may have an action such that regardless of
the actions chosen by the other players, the resulting payoff is uninformative about the
state. (For example, the payoff to an investment project that requires the participation
of all players cannot be learned if one player chooses not to contribute.) If other players
needtotailortheirpunishmentactionstothestate, suchafailureoflearningclearlycre-
ates a problem for constructing credible threats. The solution, brieﬂy, is to demonstrate
that there is a strategy available to the punishing players such that if the player being
punished can block learning, he can do so only at the cost of low payoffs in the stage
game.
Itisstraightforwardtoextendthefolktheoremtothecasewhereplayershaveprivate
information about the state of the world before the beginning of the game or where they
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also extends to the case that there are no public signals, but instead players’ private sig-
nalsareverycloselycorrelated(conditionalonthestateandtheactionproﬁle). Thecon-
struction, which requires the additional assumptions that there are at least three play-
ers and that cheap-talk communication is possible after each period, uses players’ an-
nouncements of their private signals in place of public signals. A player who announces
a different signal from the others is punished as though he had deviated, and thus he
prefers to report truthfully.
Cripps et al. (2008) (henceforth CEMS) consider a problem related to the issue in
this paper. In their setting, too, nature selects a state once and for all according to a
known prior. At least some of a ﬁnite set of players are initially uninformed about na-
ture’s choice. In each period, players receive noisy private signals of the state. There
is no game, however; the players do not interact with each other. Instead, CEMS study




relationship between their work and this paper is discussed brieﬂy in the conclusion.
The literature on repeated games with incomplete information is extensive; see
Aumann and Hart (1992)a n dAumann et al. (1995). Kalai and Lehrer (1993, 1995)e x -
amine the case where players are uncertain both about payoffs and about the strategies
of other players. Nearer to this paper, Gossner and Vieille (2003)a n dWiseman (2005)
establish folk theorems (without discounting and with discounting, respectively) for re-
peated games with symmetric learning. The most closely related papers are Fudenberg
and Yamamoto (2010)a n dYamamoto (2010), who study repeated games with imper-
fect monitoring in which players are initially uncertain both about payoffs and about
the monitoring structure; players’ private information about their own actions gener-
ates asymmetric learning about the state of nature. (Monitoring is public in Fudenberg
and Yamamoto 2010, and private in Yamamoto 2010.) They derive conditions on the
monitoring structure under which a folk theorem holds.2 Those conditions rule out the
possibility that any player can unilaterally block learning; the statewise full-rank con-
dition requires that for any two states, there is an action proﬁle with the property that
the resulting public signal distinguishes between the states, even if a single player devi-
ates. As described above, that assumption removes a signiﬁcant potential difﬁculty in
generating a folk theorem. The key assumption in this paper (Assumption 1)i st h a ta n
action proﬁle must generate different public signals in different states only if the result-
ing payoffs are different, that is, if any player can distinguish between states by observ-
ing his payoffs, then the public signals also distinguish between them. An example that
satisﬁes Assumption 1 but not the statewise full-rank condition is the joint investment
project mentioned above: each period, the project succeeds if and only if both players
exerteffort. Iftheydo, thentheexpectedreturn dependson thestateoftheworld. Ifany
player fails to exert effort, then the return is zero in any state.
2Fudenberg and Yamamoto (2011b) show that those conditions can be weakened if players have initial
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On the other hand, the models in Fudenberg and Yamamoto (2010)a n dYamamoto
(2010)allownotonlyimperfectmonitoring,butuncertaintyaboutthemonitoringstruc-
ture itself, which are substantial extensions relative to the perfect monitoring of actions
assumed in this paper. Another difference is that the proof here is constructive, while
Fudenberg and Yamamoto (2010)a n dYamamoto (2010) use an extension of the linear
programming techniques of Fudenberg and Levine (1994).
Another strand of related literature is on reputation games with two patient play-
ers; the difference in those models is that the uninformed player gets no signals of the
informed player’s type except through the actions of the informed player. Mailath and
Samuelson (2006) provide an extensive summary of research in that area; more recent
work includes Peski (2008)a n dAtakan and Ekmekci (2009, 2011, forthcoming). Sim-
ilarly, Hörner and Lovo (2009)a n dHörner et al. (2011a)s t u d yr e p e a t e dg a m e sw h e r e
each player has private information about the state at the beginning of the game, but
does not receive any further signals (except for the actions of other players).
The structure of the rest of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the model,
Section 3 contains the folk theorem and its proof, Section 4 extends the result to the
case of private, almost-public signals, and Section 5 concludes.
2. Model
There is a set   of K possible states of the world and N>1 expected-utility maximizing
players repeating a stage game inﬁnitely. The players have a common discount factor δ.
Before the start of play, the state of the world ω is chosen once and for all according to
the commonly known distribution  , which assigns strictly positive probability to each
of the K possible states. In each different state ω, the stage game G(ω) has different
payoffs but the same set of action proﬁles A = A1 × A2 ×···×AN,w h e r eAi is the set
of actions for player i;l e tL denote the number of action proﬁles. A mixed action proﬁle
is denoted by α and (mixed) actions are publicly observed.3 In each period, payoffs are
determined as follows: action proﬁle a is played, and then player i’s random payoff Ui,
which is observed by player i only, is drawn from a distribution Fi(a ω) that depends on
the action proﬁle a and the state ω. At the same time, a random public signal Z,w h o s e
distribution Fz(a ω) also varies with a and ω, is realized. Each time action proﬁle a is
played, independent draws from Fz(a ω) and Fi(a ω) are made. The expected payoff





where α(a) is the probability of pure action proﬁle a under mixed proﬁle α. A public
randomization device is available to the players.
The private payoffs Ui jointly identify the state probabilistically: for any two states
ω and ω ,t h e r ei ss o m ep l a y e ri and some action proﬁle a ∈ A such that Fi(a ω) and
3The implications of relaxing the assumption that mixed strategies rather than just the actions actually
played are observable are discussed in Section 5.222 Thomas Wiseman Theoretical Economics 7 (2012)
Fi(a ω ) differ on a set of positive measure. (That assumption is without loss of gener-
ality; two states that yield the same payoff distributions can be treated as a single state.)
The key assumption is that the public signals Z contain (probabilistically) at least the
information in the private payoffs.
Assumption 1. For any action proﬁle a ∈ A and pair of states ω ω  ∈   such that
Fi(a ω) and Fi(a ω ) differ for some player i, the distributions Fz(a ω) and Fz(a ω )
also differ.
Thus, the public signals also identify the state. The importance of Assumption 1 is
that it ensures that any player i can be (approximately) minmaxed, even when the state
is unknown, as is described in detail in the proof of Proposition 1. The idea, roughly,
is that the punishing players start by playing a tentative punishment proﬁle. If player i
responds with an action that gives him a high payoff, then the other players (i) observe
(probabilistically) the high payoff, (ii) conclude that the state is such that their tenta-
tive proﬁle is not effective, and (iii) switch to a new punishment proﬁle. That process
continues until an effective punishment proﬁle is found.
No assumptions are made about (i) the informativeness about the state ω of private
payoff Ui, conditional on action proﬁle a and public signal Z, (ii) the informativeness
about the state ω of public signal Z, conditional on action proﬁle a and the vector of
private payoffs U, (iii) the correlation between any two players’ payoffs Ui and Uj,c o n -
ditional on action proﬁle a, public signal Z,a n ds t a t eω, (iv) the dependence of private
payoff Ui on public signal Z, conditional on action proﬁle a and state ω,( v )t h er e l a -
tionship between Fz(a ω) and Fz(a  ω)or between Fi(a ω) and Fi(a  ω)across states
of the world ω (that is, about whether learning the payoff from action proﬁle a is infor-
mative about the payoff from action proﬁle a ), or (vi) whether learning the payoff from
action proﬁle a to player i is informative about the payoff from a to any other player j.
The model allows for arbitrary correlation of payoffs in each stage across players in any
given state of the world, so player i’s beliefs about player j’s private payoffs and other
higher order beliefs are unrestricted. The supports of the distributions Fi and Fz are not
required to be the same in each state of the world, so there may be public or private re-
alizations that perfectly reveal the state. In fact, the distributions may be degenerate, so
that payoffs or signals are nonstochastic (conditional on the state). Alternatively, if two
states do have the same support, players may never be able to learn the state for certain.
Examples of information structures allowed by the model include the following.
Example 1 (Purely public learning). Suppose that each player i’s private payoff Ui is
independent of the state ω, conditional on action proﬁle a and public signal Z.I nt h a t
case, private payoffs are uninformative about the state of the world and all learning is
public. This situation corresponds to the model in Wiseman (2005). ♦
Example 2 (Noisy public signal of payoffs). Suppose that the public signal Z is an N-
dimensional vector and that conditional on the vector of realized payoffs U, Z is inde-
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of each player i’s private payoff Ui and a mean-zero noise term εi that is independent
of ω. Then all available information about the state is contained in the private payoffs:
conditional on the vector U, there is no information in the public signal Z (although Z
may be informative to an individual player, who observes only his own payoff Ui). ♦
Example 3 (Known own payoffs). Suppose that each private payoff identiﬁes player i’s
payoff function for each i. That is, whenever the supports of the distributions Fi(a ω)
and Fi(a ω ) have a nonempty intersection, then Fi(a  ω)= Fi(a  ω ) for all a  ∈ A.I n
this case, players completely learn their own payoffs after a single period, although they
may still be uncertain about the payoffs of other players. This setting ﬁts (after the ﬁrst
period) models with single- or multisided reputations (and gradual public learning of
players’ types). ♦
A public history Ht contains the action proﬁles chosen and public signals realized in
periods 1 through t − 1; H1 is the null set. A private history for player i, ht
i, includes the
information in the public history plus player i’s realized payoffs; h1
i is again the null set.
Let bt
i(ht
i) ∈  K denote player i’s private belief about the state of the world at the start of
period t. Bayesian updating of the prior   using the information in the private history
(includinganyinformationaboutotherplayers’payoffsrevealedbytheiractionchoices)
yieldstheprivatebelief. Incontrast,thepublicdummybelief Bt(Ht) ∈  K isobtainedby
updating using the information in the public history except information about private
payoffs implicit in actions. Thus, the dummy belief can be calculated without reference
to equilibrium strategies. Similarly, for s ≤ t, obtain the period-s-truncated dummy be-
lief Bt\s(Ht\s) ∈  K by updating the prior using the period-s-truncated public history
Ht\s from periods s through t − 1 (again ignoring information about private payoffs);
Bt\t(Ht\t) equals the prior  .L e tEU(α b)≡
K
k=1bkEU(α ωk) be the expected payoff
vector from action α given beliefs b.
Deﬁneuasthehighestabsolutevalueofexpectedstage-gamepayoffsacrossallplay-
ers, all action proﬁles, and all states of the world, so that
u = max




Nu; no vector of expected payoffs can have a length greater than U.
For each player i and state ω,l e tmi(ω) ∈  A−i be the action proﬁle that minmaxes





EUi((ai α−i) ω) 
Let V( ω ) , deﬁned as the convex hull of the set {EU(a ω)∈ RN : a ∈ A},b et h es e to ff e a -
sible payoffs in state ω.T h e nV ∗(ω) ≡{ u ∈ V( ω ): ui >e i(ω) for all i ∈ N} is the set of
strictlyindividuallyrationalfeasiblepayoffs. Extendingthestandardfull-dimensionality
condition for folk theorems to the case of multiple states, I assume that V ∗(ω) has di-
mension N for all ω ∈  .224 Thomas Wiseman Theoretical Economics 7 (2012)
3. Results
The main result is that for any function that maps each state of the world to a payoff
vector that is feasible and strictly individually rational in that state, there exists a se-
quential equilibrium in which (with very high probability) players achieve (very close
to) the payoff speciﬁed for the realized state, as long as players are patient enough.
Proposition 1. Let ε>0 and payoffs v∗(ω1) ∈ int(V ∗(ω1))     v∗(ωK) ∈ int(V ∗(ωK))
be given, and let   be a prior belief that assigns strictly positive probability to each state.
If Assumption 1 holds, then there exists δ < 1 such that for all δ>δ , there is a sequential
equilibrium that with probability at least 1 − ε, conditional on any state ω being real-
ized, yields a payoff vector within ε of v∗(ω). In equilibrium, each player i’s private belief
converges to the truth: limt→∞bt
i(ht
i)[ω]=1 with probability 1.
The proof is constructive, using elements of Fudenberg and Maskin’s (1986)a n d
Gossner and Vieille’s (2003) folk theorems and Hörner and Olszewski’s (2006) block
strategies. The equilibrium uses play “blocks” of M + T periods each. (The values M
and T are described below.) A block has a “target payoff” v(ω) for each state ω.W i t h i n
each block, players follow strategies that rely only on the history of public signals since
the start of the block and, in particular, on the dummy belief truncated at the beginning
of the block. The ﬁrst M periods are used in experimentation to learn the state of the
world (since all previous information about the state is ignored). The most likely state ˆ ω
is identiﬁed and then in the remaining T   M periods, players choose the action proﬁle
that yields the target payoff v( ˆ ω) in state ˆ ω.I f( i )M is large enough to identify the true
state with high probability, (ii) T/(M + T)is close to 1, so that nearly all of the periods
within the block are spent playing the target action proﬁle, and (iii) players are very pa-
tient, then the expected payoff from the block when the realized state is ω is very close
to the target payoff v(ω).
There are 2N +1 types of blocks: an on-equilibrium block, a minmax block for each
player, and a postdeviation block for each player. The initial block is on-equilibrium, as
areallsubsequentblocksuntiltheﬁrstdeviation. Ifplayerideviatesduringablock,then
a minmax-i block begins in the next period and all subsequent blocks (until another
player deviates) are postdeviation-i blocks. The target payoffs in the on-equilibrium
block correspond to the desired equilibrium payoffs v∗(ω). The target payoff for player i
in his minmax block is roughly ei(ω). (Play in the minmax blocks is somewhat different
from play in the other blocks, as described in the proof.) Target payoffs in the postde-
viation blocks are chosen so that vdev-i
i (ω) < v∗
i (ω) and vdev-i
i (ω) < v
dev-j
i (ω) for each
state ω. That is, the payoff to a deviator is lower than he would get in equilibrium or
when punishing another player, regardless of the state. A patient player, then, does not
deviate, on or off the equilibrium path, regardless of his private beliefs. Simultaneous
deviations are ignored.
In a minmax block, the challenge is that the punished player i may be able to block
experimentation, making it impossible for the other players to identify the state and
play the appropriate minmax proﬁle. For example, player i m a yh a v ea na c t i o nai suchTheoretical Economics 7 (2012) Partial folk theorem for games with private learning 225
that any proﬁle that includes ai yields a payoff that is independent of the state. The re-
sulting lack of learning is a problem, since a proﬁle that minmaxes player i in one state
may give him a high payoff in another. It turns out, though, that there is a strategy for
the other players that prevents player i from simultaneously getting a high payoff and
blocking learning. Suppose that the other players play mi(ω), the proﬁle that minmaxes
player i in state ω.I fp l a y e ri’s response yields him a payoff above (in expectation) his
state-ω minmax ei(ω), then necessarily his payoff reveals that the state is not ω.T h e
public signal, by Assumption 1, reveals that information as well, and so the other play-
ers learn. The other players, then, can start a minmax-i block by playing the minmax
proﬁle mi(ω ) corresponding to the state ω  in which the minmax payoff ei(ω ) is lowest,
continue playing that proﬁle unless they learn that the state is not ω , then switch to the
minmax proﬁle for the state with the second-lowest minmax payoff, and so on. If they
follow such a strategy, then, conditional on any state ω being realized, the number of
periods in the block in which player i can attain a payoff above his minmax payoff for
thatstateei(ω)isbounded(probabilistically). Thus,ifthenumberofperiodsinthemin-
max block is high enough, then player i’s average payoff in the block cannot be (much)
greater than ei(ω).
During a minmax-i block, deviations by player i are ignored. Therefore, the optimal
strategy for player i is to play a best response to the equilibrium actions of the other
players for the remaining periods of the minmax-i block. Note that as a consequence,
the equilibrium strategies are not public strategies. The actions chosen by a player who
has not deviated depend only on the public history, but the actions of a player who has
deviatedingeneraldepend(duringthesubsequentminmaxblock)onhisprivatebeliefs.
Proof of Proposition 1.F o r e a c h s t a t e ω ∈   and each player i, choose a payoff vec-
tor vdev-i(ω) ∈ int(V ∗(ω)) such that vdev-i
i (ω) < v∗
i (ω) and vdev-i
i (ω) < v
dev-j
i (ω) for each
j  = i; these feasible, strictly individually rational payoffs are the long-run (that is, af-









for all players and states.
Choose a positive integer M to satisfy the following three conditions.
Condition 1. The integer M is divisible by L (the number of pure action proﬁles) and
by K (the number of states).
Condition 2. Conditional on any state ω, updating the prior   with the M public sig-
nalsthatresultfromplayingeachactionproﬁlea ∈ AM/ Ltimesyieldsaposteriorprob-
ability that puts weight greater than 1/2 on ω with probability at least 1−ε/(8U).
Condition 3. Take any two states ω  = ω ,a n yp l a y e ri, and any history of actions in
which (i) players other than i always play mi(ω) and (ii) in at least M/K periods, player i
plays an action ai ∈ Ai such that EUi((ai mi(ω)) ω )>e i(ω). (It need not be the same226 Thomas Wiseman Theoretical Economics 7 (2012)
such action in each of the M/K periods.) Then conditional on state ω , updating the
prior   with the resulting public signals yields a posterior probability that puts weight
less than ε/2 on ω with probability at least (1−ε/(8U))1/K.
The second condition requires that M periods of experimentation, split equally
amongallactionproﬁles,arewithhighprobabilitysufﬁcienttolearnthestatewithgreat
precision, starting from the prior. The third condition says that if the other players play
the state-ω minmax proﬁle for player i when the actual state is ω ,a n dp l a y e ri’s re-
sponse yields an expected (in state ω ) payoff above his state-ω minmax, then within
M/K periods the players very likely learn very precisely that the state is not ω.














Thus, if action proﬁle a is played for M periods and action proﬁle a  is played for T
periods instate ω, thentheaveragepayoff(withoutdiscounting) inthose M +T periods
will be close to U(a  ω), regardless of how far apart U(a  ω)and U(a ω)are.
Condition 5. GivenM and T, choose a positive integer T  ≥ T such that

M +T
M +T  +1
(−U)+
T  −T +1







M +T  +1
U +
T 




for every player i in every state ω 
sothattheaverage(undiscounted)payofftoplayeri fromT  periodsofbeingminmaxed
and M + 1 periods of any other action proﬁle is lower than his long-run payoff after
deviating, even if the payoff from the current postdeviation block happens to be low.
(The minmax blocks are constructed below to last for M +T  periods.)
Finally, the value of the discount factor δ is described later.
The equilibrium strategies are based on 2N + 1 types of blocks, as described above.
There are an on-equilibrium block, a postdeviation block for each player, and a minmax
block for each player.
Within-block strategies. The on-equilibrium block has length M + T periods. Order
the action proﬁles A arbitrarily as A ={ a1     aL}. The players play proﬁle a1 for the
ﬁrst M/Lperiods of the block, a2 for the next M/Lperiods, and so on for the rest of the
ﬁrst M periods. In a block that begins in period s, that experimentation yields the trun-
cated dummy belief Bs+M\s(Hs+M\s).L e tˆ ω(Hs+M\s) denote the state given the highest
probability under Bs+M\s(Hs+M\s). (Ties can be broken arbitrarily.) For the remain-
ing T periods of the block, players play the proﬁle that results in payoff v∗( ˆ ω(Hs+M\s))
in state ˆ ω(Hs+M\s). Within the block, simultaneous deviations are ignored. If player i
deviates unilaterally, then the on-equilibrium block ends immediately and a minmax-i
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Play in a postdeviation-i block is similar. The only difference is that in the last T pe-
riods, the proﬁle yielding payoff vdev-i( ˆ ω(Hs+M\s)) in state ˆ ω(Hs+M\s) is played, rather
than the proﬁle yielding v∗( ˆ ω(Hs+M\s)). The construction of the block is the same; only
the target payoffs differ.
Theconstructionofaminmax-iblock,whichhaslengthM+T  periods,issomewhat
different. For convenience, suppose that the K states of the world are indexed such that
ei(ω1) ≤ ei(ω2) ≤···≤ei(ωK).T h a t i s , p l a y e r i’s minmax payoff is lowest in state ω1
and increases up through state ωK. In each period of a minmax-i block that begins
in period s, players other than i play the minmax proﬁle mi(ωk) corresponding to the
lowest-indexed state ωk that has probability at least ε/2 under the period-s-truncated
dummy belief Bt\s(Ht\s). (For example, they start the block by playing mi(ω1) if state ω1
has probability ε/2 or higher under the prior  .) When there are R periods remaining in
the block, player i plays the R-period best response, given his private belief, to the pub-
lic strategies used by the other players in the rest of the block. (That is, he constructs
a best response by backward induction, as though the last period of the minmax block
were the end of the game.) If he has multiple best responses, his equilibrium-speciﬁed
choice among them is common knowledge. Since deviations by player i (who is using
a private strategy) may not be detectable, none of his actions is considered a deviation:
asimultaneousdeviationbyplayersiandj istreatedasaunilateraldeviationbyplayerj.
(That is, the other players do not interpret any action by player i as a deviation.) Among
the other players, simultaneous deviations are ignored. If any player j  = i deviates uni-
laterally, then the minmax-i block ends immediately and a minmax-j block begins in
the next period (as described below).
Transitions between blocks. Play begins with an on-equilibrium block. An on-
equilibrium block in which there are no unilateral deviations is followed by another on-
equilibrium block, and a postdeviation-i block with no unilateral deviations is followed
by another postdeviation-i block. A minmax-i block with no unilateral deviations (by a
player other than player i) is followed by a postdeviation-i block.
During an equilibrium block or postdeviation-i block, if player j (possibly j = i)d e -
viates unilaterally, then a transition to a minmax-j block occurs in the next period. Fi-
nally, inthecaseofadeviationduringaminmax-i blockbyaplayer j otherthanplayer i,
a transition to a minmax-j block occurs in the next period.
Beliefs. On the equilibrium path, each player’s private belief bt
i(ht
i) is derived by
Bayesianupdatingoftheprior   using theinformation in hisprivatehistory ht
i. Actions,
because they depend only on the public signals, reveal nothing about players’ private
payoffs. Off equilibrium, a player’s decision to deviate is also treated as uninformative.
Afterplayer i deviates, hisactionsinthesubsequentminmax-i blockmaydependonhis
historyofprivatepayoffs, andsotheotherplayers’privatebeliefsincorporatethatinfor-
mation. (Notethatduringthattime,playerihasnoincentivetodeviatefromashort-run
best response so as to inﬂuence others’ beliefs, since their actions depend only on the
public history. On the other hand, his choice of a short-run best response reﬂects any
expected beneﬁt from inﬂuencing the ﬂow of public signals.)
Payoffs. Condition 2 implies that with probability at least 1−ε/(8U),t h eM periods
of experimentation at the beginning of an on-equilibrium block identify the true state ω228 Thomas Wiseman Theoretical Economics 7 (2012)
asthemostlikely. Inthatevent,theexpected(undiscounted)averagepayoffoftheblock
iswithin ε/4 ofitstargetpayoff v∗(ω), byCondition4. Ifthewrongstateisidentiﬁed, the
expected payoff cannot differ from v∗(ω)b ym o r et h a nt w i c eU (the greatest possible
magnitude of any payoff vector). Conditional on state ω, therefore, the expected undis-
















conditional on state ω, is strictly within ε/2 of the target vdev-i.
Now consider the payoff to player i from a minmax-i block in state ω.W i t hp r o b -
ability 1 − ε/(8U)or higher, the number of periods in which player i’s expected payoff
is above his minmax ei(ω) is no greater than M: Condition 3 ensures that the only way
player i can prevent the other players from learning the state (and punishing him ac-
cordingly) is by playing actions that yield him payoffs no better than ei(ω).( F o re x a m -
ple, if ei(ω) is the third-lowest minmax payoff for player i across all states, then players
following the strategies for a minmax-i block most likely take no more than 2M/K peri-
ods of high payoffs for player i to rule out the two states with lower minmaxes.) By an
argument similar to the one in the last paragraph, then, Condition 4 (plus the fact that
T  ≥ T) ensures that the expected payoff to player i from a minmax-i block in state ω is
strictly within ε/2 of ei(ω). The expected payoff to any other player must be at least −U.
Since the expected (conditional on state ω) undiscounted average payoff of an on-
equilibrium block is strictly within ε/2 of its target payoff v∗(ω), for high enough values
of the discount factor δ, the expected discounted average payoff is also within ε/2 of
v∗(ω). Similarly, the expected discounted average payoffs of a postdeviation-i block and
a minmax-i block are within ε/2 of their target payoffs vdev-i(ω) and ei(ω), respectively,
when δ is high. Formally, let κ<ε / 2 be the maximum (across states ω and players i)
difference between the expected undiscounted average payoff and the target payoff of
any of the three types of blocks. Then a sufﬁcient condition on the value of δ<1 is the
following condition.
Condition 6. For any S ≤ M + T  and any sequence of payoff vectors {xs}S
s=1,w h e r e
























Best-response conditions. The value of thediscount factor δ c a nb ec h o s e ns ot h a tn o
player has an incentive to deviate, on or off the equilibrium path, whatever his private
belief about the state or his higher order beliefs (about others’ beliefs), and whatever the
truncated dummy belief. In a minmax-i block, player i has no incentive to deviate: he
is playing a short-run best response within the block, and his actions do not affect play
after the block. On the equilibrium path, there is no proﬁtable deviation if Condition 6
and the following condition hold.Theoretical Economics 7 (2012) Partial folk theorem for games with private learning 229


































After a deviation in state ω,p l a y e ri’s long-run payoff is vdev-i
i (ω): play switches to a
postdeviation-i blockafteraminmax-i block. Evenif(i)bydeviating,player i cangetthe
highest possible immediate payoff, (ii) player i expects to get the lowest possible payoff
for the rest of the current block (for example, because of a divergence between his pri-




i (ω) > ε, Condition 7 is satisﬁed for high enough values of δ.
Similarly, because v
dev-j
i (ω) − vdev-i
i (ω) > ε,i fδ is high enough, then no player j  = i
has a proﬁtable deviation during a postdeviation-i block or a minmax-i block, even if
minmaxing player i gives player j the lowest possible payoff. All that remains is to show
that player i cannot gain from deviating during a postdeviation-i block. In that case, a
deviation does not affect player i’s long-run payoff (which is still vdev-i
i (ω)), but in the
short run, the deviation triggers a minmax-i block and lowers his payoff. In particular,
the following condition (together with Condition 6) implies that no such deviation is
proﬁtable.
























That is, even if deviating results in the highest possible immediate payoff and not
deviating results in the lowest possible immediate payoff for the rest of the block, the
overall payoff from deviating is lower, no matter how many periods of the block remain.
Condition 5 guarantees that Condition 8 is satisﬁed for high δ.
Finally,notethatsinceforhigh δ, theexpectedpayofffromanon-equilibriumblock,
conditional on any state ω being realized, is within ε/2 of v∗(ω), so is the expected equi-
librium payoff of the repeated game. Since both payoff realizations and public signals
areindependentandidenticallydistributedacrossperiods(conditionalonthestateand
actions), a central limit theorem implies that the undiscounted average of the ﬁrst S dis-















where Ut is the vector of realized payoffs in period t), converges over time to a normally
distributed random vector with a mean that is also within ε/2 of v∗(ω);t h ev a r i a n c e230 Thomas Wiseman Theoretical Economics 7 (2012)
shrinks to zero. Thus, we can choose S∗ such that with probability at least 1 − ε, vS(ω)
is within 3ε/4 of v∗(ω) for all S ≥ S∗. Therefore, if δ is high enough, then the limiting
discounted average of the block payoffs (which is the realized payoff of the repeated
game) is with probability at least 1 − ε within ε of v∗(ω). A sufﬁcient condition on the
value of δ<1 is the following condition.
Condition 9. For any sequence of payoff vectors {xs}S∗























If the discount factor δ is high enough to satisfy Conditions 6–9, then the strategies
and beliefs constructed constitute a sequential equilibrium in which, with high prob-
ability, the players achieve payoffs close to those speciﬁed for the realized state. Since
players experiment at the beginning of each on-equilibrium block, their private beliefs
converge to the truth with probability 1.  
In the model of Section 2, players get (direct) information about the state of the
world only from the public signals and from their own realized payoffs. In many set-
tings, though, players might learn about the state in other ways during the game or be-
fore play starts; some of the examples discussed in the Introduction ﬁt that assumption.
In such an environment, the strategies constructed in the proof of Proposition 1 are still
an equilibrium; the key is that each player, no matter what is the gap between his pri-
vate belief and the public signals in the current block, expects that the public signals
from experimentation in future blocks will identify the true state with high probability.
Proposition 2 states that result formally.
Proposition 2. Suppose that in any realized state ω, each player i in each period t ∈
{0 1    } observesa privatesignaldrawnfromadistribution Fit(ω).L e tε>0 andpayoffs
v∗(ω1) ∈ int(V ∗(ω1))     v∗(ωK) ∈ int(V ∗(ωK)) be given, and let   be a prior belief that
assigns strictly positive probability to each state. If Assumption 1 holds, then there exists
δ < 1suchthatforallδ>δ,thereisasequentialequilibriumthatwithprobabilityatleast
1−ε, conditionalonstate ω, yieldsapayoffvectorwithin ε of v∗(ω). Inequilibrium, each
player i’s private belief converges to the truth: limt→∞bt
i(ht
i)[ω]=1 with probability 1.
4. Private, almost-public signals
Inthissection, Proposition1isextendedtothecasewheretheremaybenopublicsignal
z, but, instead, in each period players receive private signals of the vector of realized
payoffs, and those signals are very closely correlated.4 Formally, the model is modiﬁed
in two ways.
4MailathandMorris(2002)showthatanystrictperfectpublicequilibriumwithboundedrecallofagame
with public monitoring remains an equilibrium under private, almost-public monitoring. The strategies
constructed in the proof of Proposition 1 do not have bounded recall, though: the short-run best response
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First, at the end of each period, each player i observes his own realized payoff Ui,
as well as a private signal Yi that reﬂects the payoffs of all players (including player i).
The distribution of Yi, Fyi(a ω), depends on the action proﬁle a and the state ω.E v e r y
time action proﬁle a is played, an independent draw from Fyi(a ω) is made. For each
player i, the private signal Yi contains (probabilistically) at least the information in the
private payoff: for any action proﬁle a ∈ A and pair of states ω ω  ∈   such that Fi(a ω)
and Fi(a ω ) differ, the distributions Fyi(a ω) and Fyi(a ω ) also differ. (A motivating
special case is that Yi = (Y1
i      YN
i ),w h e r eYi
i ≡ Ui, is a vector of observations of each
player’s payoff. A player observes his own payoff exactly, and those of other players with
noise.) A player’s private signal may or may not be independent (conditional on a and
ω) of his realized payoff or of other players’ payoffs.
Second, after observing his signal and before the start of the next period, each
player i can send a costless, public signal from the support of Fyi. These signals are
cheap talk: they are used to communicate private signals, but players are free to an-
nounce any signal that they wish. (These cheap-talk signals also are used to let a player
specify the action proﬁle that he wants to be played during his “reward period,” as de-
scribed in the proof of Proposition 3.) Player i’s private history ht
i contains the action
proﬁles chosen and public announcements made in periods 1 through t − 1,a sw e l la s
player i’s realized payoffs and private signals. Recall that a public randomization device
is available.
Following Mailath and Samuelson (2006), say that players’ private signals are al-
most public when each player, after receiving any private signal, no matter how unlikely,
assigns high probability to the other players’ having seen the same signal. Note that
almost-public signals identify the state, since Fyi(a ω)  = Fyi(a ω ) whenever Fi(a ω)  =
Fi(a ω ),a n dFyi and Fyj are arbitrarily close.
Definition.F o r η ∈[ 0 1], signals are η-public if for any player i, any action proﬁle a,
any state ω, any realized payoff ui, and any private signal yi, the probability, conditional
on the event Ui = ui and Yi = yi,t h a tYj = yi for all j ∈{ 1     N} is at least 1−η.
(Note that in the special case described above, η-public signals must also be η-
perfect: player i observes his own payoff Ui,s op l a y e rj’s signal of Ui can match player
i’s only if it is exactly correct.)
Proposition 1 extends to this environment when the private signals are almost pub-
lic. Proposition 3 gives the formal statement:
Proposition 3. Suppose that N ≥ 3.L e t ε>0 and payoffs v∗(ω1) ∈ int(V ∗(ω1))     
v∗(ωK) ∈ int(V ∗(ωK)) be given, and let   be a prior belief that assigns strictly positive
probability to each state. If Assumption 1 holds, then there exists δ < 1 and η>0 such
that if δ>δand signals are η-public, there is a sequential equilibrium that with prob-
ability at least 1 − ε, conditional on any state ω being realized, yields a payoff vector
within ε of v∗(ω). In equilibrium, each player i’s private belief converges to the truth:
limt→∞bt
i(ht
i)[ω]=1 with probability 1.232 Thomas Wiseman Theoretical Economics 7 (2012)
The strategies used to prove Proposition 3 are very similar to those in the proof of
Proposition1,withpublic,cheap-talkannouncementsofprivatesignalstakingtheplace
of public signals as a coordinating device. The additional difﬁculty is to provide incen-
tives for honest reporting. The solution to that difﬁculty is to punish when players’ re-
ports do not agree. Thus, a player wants to announce whatever he believes that other
players are going to announce, and when signals are almost public, he believes that
other players see (and announce) the same signals that he observes. The close corre-
lation of players’ signals is important in this argument. Without it, a player who assigns
high probability to state 1 but sees a signal that is very unlikely in that state may believe
that other players probably did not see the same signal. As long as there are at least
three players reporting their signals, it is possible to identify (and punish) any single
player who makes an announcement that differs from all the others.5
Proof of Proposition 3. Choose the vectors of punishment payoffs vdev-i, the inte-
gers M (satisfying Conditions 1–3), T (satisfying Condition 4), and T  (satisfying Condi-
tion5),andthevalueofδ(satisfyingConditions6–8)justasintheproofofProposition1.
Alsoasbefore,thereare2N+1typesofblocks: anon-equilibriumblock,apostdeviation
block for each player, and a minmax block for each player.
Within-block strategies. Just as before, the on-equilibrium block and the postdevia-
tion-i blockshavelengthM+T periods,andtheminmax-i blockslastforM+T  periods
(except as described below). At the end of each period (with one exception, also de-
scribed below), players announce their private signals truthfully. If at least N −1 players
announce the same signal y in period t, then the dummy public signal for period t, ˆ zt,
is equal to y; otherwise, a multilateral misreport occurs. (In that case, no dummy pub-
lic signal is generated, as described below.) A period-s-truncated dummy public history
ˆ Ht\s contains the action proﬁles chosen and dummy public signals reported in periods
s+1throught−1.Ap l a y e runilaterallymisreportsifhereportsasignaly  whiletheother
players unanimously announce a different signal y. Note that either type of misreport
may occur in equilibrium. As usual, a player deviates if he chooses an action in the stage
game other than what is prescribed by the equilibrium strategies. A player who deviates
or misreports is said to have committed a violation. Violations are punished in the same
way that unilateral deviations are in the public-history case. (For that reason, blocks
other than on-equilibrium blocks may occur in equilibrium, so it is misleading to label
only the one type of block as “on equilibrium.” Nevertheless, for the sake of consistency,
that nomenclature is maintained.)
Consider ﬁrst an on-equilibrium block that starts in period s. As long as no multi-
lateral misreports occur, play is just as in the public-history case, treating the dummy
public signals as the public signals and treating both types of violations as unilateral
deviations. Speciﬁcally, the players play proﬁle a1 for the ﬁrst M/L periods of the
block, play a2 for the next M/L periods, and so on for the ﬁrst M periods. That ex-
perimentation yields a truncated dummy public history ˆ H
s+M\s
. For the remaining
5This approach is similar to the construction introduced in Renault (2001) and generalized in Renault
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T periods of the block, players play the proﬁle that results in payoff v∗( ˆ ω( ˆ Hs+M\s))
in state ˆ ω( ˆ Hs+M\s),w h e r e ˆ ω( ˆ Hs+M\s) is the state given the highest probability under
Bs+M\s( ˆ Hs+M\s). If there is a misreport (unilateral or multilateral) or a unilateral devia-
tion in an on-equilibrium block, then the block ends and the next block starts immedi-
ately. (The type of the next block is determined according to the transition rules below.)
Multilateral deviations are ignored.
Playinapostdeviation-i blockisthesameasinanon-equilibriumblock, exceptthat
in the last T periods (barring misreports or unilateral deviations), the proﬁle that yields
payoff vdev-i( ˆ ω( ˆ Hs+M\s)) instate ˆ ω( ˆ Hs+M\s) isplayed, ratherthantheproﬁlethatyields
v∗( ˆ ω( ˆ Hs+M\s)).
For a minmax-i block starting in period s, play is again just as in the public-signal
case, using the dummy public signals in the place of actual public signals and treating
misreports as deviations. As in the public-signal case, suppose that the K states of the
world are indexed such that ei(ω1) ≤ ei(ω2) ≤···≤ei(ωK). As long as no player other
than i has committed a violation, then in each period those players play the minmax
proﬁle mi(ωk) that corresponds to the lowest-indexed state ωk that has probability at
least ε/2 under Bt\s( ˆ Ht\s). When there are R periods remaining in the block, player i
plays the (or a speciﬁed) R-period best response, given his private belief, to the public
strategies used by the other players in the rest of the block. Deviations by player i are
ignored, as are simultaneous deviations by two or more of the other players. If a single
player j  = i commits a unilateral violation, then the minmax-i block ends immediately
and a minmax-j block begins in the next period (as described below). If a multilateral
misreport occurs, then the block ends and the next block (a postdeviation-i block, as
described below) starts immediately. To give player i the incentive to announce his pri-
vate signals truthfully, there is potentially a single “reward period” added to the end of
the block. In each period of the block that all players announce the same signal, the
probability that such a reward period is played increases (from an initial value of zero)
by   = 1/(M +T ). (The total probability is bounded above by 1, since M + T  is the
length of the block.) At the end of the block, public randomization determines whether
t h er e w a r dp e r i o di sp l a y e d ,a n dp l a y e ri announces the action proﬁle αR to be played
in the reward period; αR is the proﬁle that maximizes player i’s expected payoff in the
stage game, given his private belief. If the reward period is to occur, then αR is played.
Players do not make an announcement at the end of a reward period.
Transitions between blocks. Transitions are just as in the public-signal case, with
two differences: unilateral misreports are treated like deviations and, after a multilat-
eral misreport, the next block starts immediately. Play begins with an on-equilibrium
block. An on-equilibrium block in which there are no unilateral violations is followed
by another on-equilibrium block, and a postdeviation-i block with no unilateral viola-
tions is followed by another postdeviation-i block. A minmax-i block with no unilat-
eral deviations or unilateral misreports (by a player other than player i) is followed by a
postdeviation-i block. Those transitions occur immediately if a multilateral misreport
occurs; otherwise, they occur after the end of the current block.234 Thomas Wiseman Theoretical Economics 7 (2012)
Duringanequilibriumblockorpostdeviation-i block,ifplayer j (possibly j = i)com-
mits a unilateral violation, then a transition to a minmax-j block occurs in the next pe-
riod.6 Finally, in the case of a unilateral violation during a minmax-i block by a player j
other than player i, a transition to a minmax-j block occurs in the next period.
Beliefs. On the equilibrium path, each player’s private belief bt
i(ht
i) is derived by
Bayesian updating of the prior   using the information in his private history ht
i, in-
cluding the private signals of the other players, which are believed to be truthfully an-
nounced. Because they depend only on the public signals, actions reveal nothing about
players’ private information. Off equilibrium, any player i’s decision to deviate is also
treated as uninformative, as is an announcement of a signal outside the support of Fyi.
After player i commits a unilateral deviation or misreport, his actions during the subse-
quent minmax-i block may depend on his private information, and so the other players’
private beliefs incorporate that information.
Payoffs and best-response conditions. If the probability that players receive differ-
ent private signals is zero (η = 0), then the arguments of the public-signal case ensure
that the actions speciﬁed above are best responses, that with high probability the play-
ers achieve payoffs close to those speciﬁed for the realized state, and that private be-
liefs converge to the truth with probability 1. For small enough values of η,t h ee x -
pected (conditional on state ω) discounted average payoff of an on-equilibrium block,
a postdeviation-i block, and a minmax-i block are still within ε/2 of v∗(ω), vdev-i(ω),
and ei(ω), respectively, when δ is high, so the same arguments apply. (The behavior of
ap l a y e ri during a minmax-i block may change when η is slightly positive rather than
0, because he may have been playing only a weak best response, but in all other cases,
the best-response conditions were satisﬁed with strict inequalities.) All that remains is
to show that truthfully reporting private signals is a best response.
During an on-equilibrium block, for example, a player’s announcement can inﬂu-
ence future play in three ways. First, it affects whether a transition to the next block
occurs immediately (as it does after a misreport). Second, it affects the type of future
blocks by inﬂuencing whether a misreport occurs and which kind. Third, if another
player unilaterally commits a violation in the future, then afterward his play in the short
run depends on his private beliefs and thus on past announcements. With regard to
the ﬁrst effect, the greatest possible (undiscounted, expected) gain from a false report
is the maximum difference between two payoffs in the stage game times the number
of periods in the block, 2U(M + T). The cost from the second effect is that unless one
of the other players receives a signal different from his own (an event that occurs with
probability no greater than η), player i’s false report results in a unilateral misreport and
the resulting punishment: a lower continuation payoff. The third effect has a negligi-
ble effect on expected payoffs for small values of η, because misreports become very
rare and unilateral deviations are off-path (for any η) starting from any history. Thus,
when η is low enough, Conditions 6 and 7, which ensure that player i has no incentive
to deviate from his prescribed action during an on-equilibrium block, also guarantee
6Theconditionthat N ≥ 3 isusedhere. Notethatif N = 2, thenwheneverthetwoplayersreportdifferent
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that truthfully reporting private signals is optimal. Similarly, Conditions 6 and 7 also de-
ter false reporting by player i during postdeviation-j blocks and minmax-j blocks, and
Conditions 6 and 8 sufﬁce during postdeviation-i blocks.
During a minmax-i block, unilateral misreports by player i do not affect the type of
futureblocks,sofuturepunishmentcannotdeterfalsereportingbyplayer i.I n s t e a d ,t h e
reward period gives player i the incentive to report truthfully. The continuation payoff
from future blocks when η is small is close to vdev-i(ω), conditional on state ω.T h u s ,
player i’s expected payoff from αR (the proﬁle, to be played in the reward period, that
maximizes his expected payoff in the stage game) strictly exceeds his expected contin-
uation payoff when the next block starts, whatever his private beliefs are. Let d denote
the difference. Player i gains in expectation  d at the end of the current block whenever
his report matches the reports of the other players (and there are no misreports later in
the block), so truthful reporting yields an expected gain of at least δM+T 
(1−η)M+T 
 d.
Alternatively, player i can gain from a false report only if at least one other player j re-
ceives a signal different from player i’s: in that case, a false report can generate either a
unilateral misreport by player j (so that future punishment is transferred to player j)o r
a multilateral misreport that ends the current block early. However, the event that some
other player receives a different signal occurs with probability no greater than η.T h u s ,
for δ and small enough η, truthful reporting is optimal.
Thus, when N ≥ 3 and signals are η-public for low enough η, then the strategies and
beliefs constructed constitute a sequential equilibrium in which with high probability
the players achieve payoffs close to those speciﬁed for the realized state, and private
beliefs converge to the truth with probability 1.  
As was the case with public signals, the strategies constructed above still constitute
an equilibrium if players receive additional private signals about the state of the world
before or during play.
Proposition 4. Suppose that N ≥ 3 and suppose that in any realized state ω, each
player i in each period t ∈{ 0 1    } observes a private signal drawn from a distribution
Fit(ω).L e tε>0 and payoffs v∗(ω1) ∈ int(V ∗(ω1))     v∗(ωK) ∈ int(V ∗(ωK)) be given,
andlet beapriorbeliefthatassignsstrictlypositiveprobabilitytoeachstate. IfAssump-
tion 1 holds, then there exists δ < 1 and η>0 such that if δ>δand signals are η-public,
there is a sequential equilibrium that with probability at least 1 −ε, conditional on state
ω, yields a payoff vector within ε of v∗(ω). In equilibrium, each player i’s private belief
converges to the truth: limt→∞bt
i(ht
i)[ω]=1 with probability 1.
5. Summary and discussion
This paper presents a form of folk theorem for repeated games with unknown payoffs
when players receive both private and public signals. The environment is a generaliza-
tion of the one in Wiseman (2005), and Proposition 1 is a stronger result than Theorem 1
in Wiseman (2005). (The result in the earlier paper establishes only that expected equi-
librium payoffs are close to the targets, while Proposition 1 ensures that with high prob-
ability the realized payoffs are close.) Thus, this paper provides an alternative proof of
Theorem 1 in Wiseman (2005).236 Thomas Wiseman Theoretical Economics 7 (2012)
The strategies described in Sections 2 and 3 rely on the assumption that the mixed
actions used by players are observable only in the construction of the minmax blocks.
If, instead, only the actions played are observed, then the folk theorems continue to
holdforpayoffsabovethepure-strategyminmaxpayoffs,ratherthanthemixed-strategy
minmax payoffs ei(ω). Alternatively, it seems feasible to restore the result for the mixed-
strategy minmax case using the arguments of Fudenberg and Maskin (1986, Section 6)
and Gossner (1995), although the extension is not immediate.
As mentioned in the Introduction, CEMS study common learning. To focus on that
topic, they strip away from their environment strategic considerations, as well as the
ability for a player to learn other players’ private signals through their actions and the
ability of a player to try to manipulate that learning. Those complications do arise
in this paper. The endogeneity of the private signals (they depend on actions) is an-
other challenge. The availability of repeated-game punishments and incentives, how-
ever, greatly simpliﬁes the task of identifying sufﬁcient conditions for a folk theorem,
relative to CEMS’s environment. On the other hand, Proposition 1 says nothing about
whether common learning occurs in the equilibrium construction or, more generally,
about whether common learning is a necessary or sufﬁcient condition for this kind of
folk theorem.
It seems likely that the folk theorem in this paper (or some version of it) can be ex-
tended to settings where the state of the world changes over time or where the public
signals are less revealing.
A dynamic state might evolve according to a Markov process, with players possibly
unable to observe when a transition takes place. More generally, the transition and its
observability might depend on the players’ actions. Given the “repeated sampling” fea-
ture of the equilibrium constructed in this paper, it should be straightforward to modify
thatequilibriumtoapplytothecaseofdynamicstates. Onecomplicationistherelation-
shipbetweenthefrequencyatwhichthestatechangestothespeedatwhichplayerscan
learn the state through public signals: if the former is too high relative to the latter, then
the folk theorem may fail. (Dutta 1995, Fudenberg and Yamamoto 2011a, Hörner et al.
2011b,a n dPeski and Wiseman 2012 derive folk theorems for classes of such stochastic
games for the case where state transitions are publicly observed.)
Finally, it would be interesting to weaken the assumption that the public signal con-
tains at least as much information (statistically) as all of the private payoffs taken collec-
tively. It may be the case, then, that there are two distinct states of the world in which
the distribution of the public signal is the same for a given action proﬁle, even though
one or more players get different payoffs from that proﬁle in the different states. With-
out the assumption, however, the construction of the minmax blocks fails. Player i may
get a high payoff in response to the state-ω1 minmax proﬁle without the other players
ever realizing it. Roughly, it may be that player i learns the state, but the other players
do not—an outcome that clearly limits the scope of punishment (and thus of the pay-
offs achievable in equilibrium). To take advantage of that asymmetry in information,
however, player i must not reveal the state through his actions. His best response to
the other players’ punishment strategy, though, may vary with the state; there is thus a
tension between the desire to use his private information and the desire to conceal it.Theoretical Economics 7 (2012) Partial folk theorem for games with private learning 237
Figure 1. Player 1’s payoffs in the two states.
Consider the following two-state, two-player example, in which player 1 can distinguish
between states and player 2 cannot. Figure 1 shows the payoffs of player 1 in each state.
In state 1, player 2 minmaxes player 1 with action L, resulting in a minmax payoff of 1.
In state 2, R is the minmax proﬁle and 2 is the minmax payoff. If player 2 is uncertain
about the state and tries to punish player 1 using the strategy from the minmax block
constructed in the previous section, then he begins by playing L, the minmax proﬁle in
state 1 (the state with the lower minmax payoff). Player 1’s best response to L is T in
both states, however, so her action does not reveal the state. Thus, in state 2, this strat-
egy give player 1 a payoff of 3, which is not an effective punishment. Suppose, however,
that instead player 2 punishes by beginning with action R. Player 1’s best response de-
pends on the state: it is T in state 1 and B in state 2. If he responds by playing T in both
states,theninstate2,hegets0,whichisbelowhisminmax. IfherespondswithBinboth
states, then in state 1, he gets 0, which is below his minmax. To best respond, then, he
must condition his action on the state, thus revealing the state to player 2 and enabling
her to punish effectively.
Similar situations arise in the study of repeated two-player zero-sum games with in-
complete information on one side. The analysis of, for example, Aumann et al. (1995)
(in particular, the notion of Blackwell 1956 approachability) can be applied to help de-
termine the lower bound of feasible punishments for each player in each state.7 (Hart
1985 is also relevant.)
Both extensions are subjects for future research.
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